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Torts-CIVIL PROCEDURE-NONJOINDER OF MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY
INSURERS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d
1003 (Fla. 1978).
The nonjoinder of third party liability insurers as defendants in
tort claims against the insured has been a fertile topic of both judi-
cial and legislative debate over the past decade. On the one hand,
the Florida Legislature, acting as the chief policy setting body of the
state, has provided for the nonjoinder of motor vehicle liability in-
surers.' On the other hand, in Markert v. Johnston' the Florida
Supreme Court has succeeded in frustrating this legislative objec-
tive by holding section 627.7262, Florida Statutes3 unconstitutional.
This statute, which was the legislature's first enactment of a non-
joinder policy for motor vehicle liability insurers, generally prohib-
ited the joinder of these insurers at the initiation of a lawsuit.4
The Markert decision was issued in response to three consolidated
cases.' The question before the court was whether joinder of liability
insurers is a procedural issue controlled by the constitutional rule-
making authority of the court, or a substantive issue controlled by
the legislature.' The practical distinction between substance and
procedure is difficult to ascertain in actuality, although theoretical
distinctions are readily available.7 Procedural concepts include the
"course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or
steps . . ." in which litigation proceeds. Substantive law encom-
passes those rules and principles which determine primary rights
Markert did not resolve the issue of whether joinder of liability
insurers is a procedural or substantive issue. Instead, the court sim-
ply found that the statute was procedural in form, and therefore, an
impermissible infringement upon the court's own constitutional
powers.'0
1. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1977).
2. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
3. (1977).
4. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262(1) (1977) provides in part that "[n]o motor vehicle liability
insurer shall be joined as a party defendant in an action to determine the insured's liability."
Initial joinder is not prohibited if the insurer has asserted or will assert a policy defense. Id.
at § 627.7262(3).
5. 367 So. 2d at 1004 & n.1.
6. Id. at 1004. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) is the provision granting rulemaking authority
to the supreme court. In pertinent part, that provision states that "[tihe supreme court shall
adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all [state] courts ....
7. See 367 So. 2d at 1004.
8. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J.,
concurring).
9. Id.
10. 367 So. 2d at 1005-06. The Markert court held the statute unconstitutional on the
basis of FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, which provides for the separation of governmental powers.
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Public policy may be established by the judiciary in the absence
of legislative action."' Prior to the adoption of section 627.7262, the
Florida Supreme Court was the sole policymaker on the issue of
joinder or nonjoinder of motor vehicle liability insurers.2 In 1936, in
Artille v. Davidson, the court ruled that joinder was not allowed. 3
The Artille court rejected the plaintiff's argument that he was a
third party beneficiary to the contract between the insured and the
insurer. Instead, the court found that the injured party was not in
privity with the insurer, nor was the insurer liable in tort to the
plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff had no cause of action against the
insurer."
Artille was overruled thirty-three years later in Shingleton v.
Bussey. 5 The supreme court in Shingleton changed the nonjoinder
rule as a matter of public policy. 6 The court recognized that the
initial reason for nonjoinder was to prevent the disclosure of the
defendant's insurance coverage to the jury. Knowing of the cover-
age, the jury might increase its award of damages on the assumption
that an affluent insurance company would bear the cost of the judg-
ment, rather than the individual defendant. However, the
Shingleton court found that juries had matured and that their
knowledge of joinder could actually benefit the insurer by allowing
the jury to know the limits of the insurance policy and to adjust the
award accordingly. 7 In addition, the court reasoned that the initial
joinder of insurance companies was desirable because this procedure
allowed "all cards [to be placed] on the table,"' 8 including possible
defenses to the claim. Also, initial joinder would eliminate the need
for additional or collateral proceedings to enforce the judgment
since the insurer would be a party to the original suit. Thus, initial
joinder might reduce the multiplicity of suits. 9
The basis for direct joinder was established by determining that
an injured member of the general public was a third party benefici-
ary to a contract between an insured and an insurer." Extrinsic
support for this judicial determination was assumed from the intent
of the parties. The court noted that the parties to a contract for a
11. Baker v. United States, 27 F.2d 863, 875 (1st Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656
(1929).
12. 367 So. 2d at 1004-05.
13. 170 So. 707, 708 (Fla. 1936).
14. Id.
15. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
16. Id. at 715, 718.
17. Id. at 718.
18. Id. at 720.
19. Id. at 718.
20. Id. at 716.
CASE COMMENTS
liability policy contemplated injury to a third party. Therefore, by
operation of law, an injured party became a third party beneficiary
who was "entitled to maintain a cause of action directly against the
liability insurer of the tort-feasor . . 1
The Shingleton court also addressed the issue of when liability to
the third party accrues. The court reasoned that the injured party's
right to sue the insurance carrier should vest at the time the injured
party became entitled to sue the insured.2 2 Although the liability of
the insured for judgment is a condition precedent to the liability of
the insurer for judgment, the court found that this condition would
not affect the insurer's liability to be sued initially.23 After making
this determination, the court found that nonjoinder clauses in liabil-
ity policies infringed upon the plaintiff's right to a speedy trial.24
The effect of these clauses was to postpone liability and to prohibit
any direct action against the insurer. Therefore, the plaintiff's re-
covery was delayed.2 Thus, the court found that the parties had no
right to contract for nonjoinder unless the legislature, in its exercise
of police power, affirmatively authorized insurers to include non-
joinder clauses in the policies. 6 This legislative action would appar-
ently prevent the joinder of the insurer pursuant to the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure."
One year after Shingleton, in Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory,
the court extended initial joinder from automobile liability insurers
to liability insurers in all tort claims.28 However, even though
pretrial discovery of insurance coverage was available to plaintiffs,
the Gregory court thought that the "existence or amount of insur-
ance coverage has no bearing on the issues of liability and damages,
21. Id.
22. Id. at 716.
23. Id. at 716-17.
24. Id. at 717 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4).
25. 223 So. 2d at 717.
26. Id. at 717-19.
27. Id. at 718. Under FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.210(a), joinder may occur as follows:
Parties Generally. Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest, but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a
party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of
another or a party expressly authorized by statute may sue in his own name without
joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought. All persons
having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded
may join as plaintiffs and any person may be made a defendant who has or claims
an interest adverse to the plaintiff. Any person may at any time be made a party if
his presence is necessary or proper to a complete determination of the cause. Per-
sons having a united interest may be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or de-
fendants, and when any one refuses to join, he may for such reason be made a
defendant.
28. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
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and such evidence should not be considered by the jury. 29
In 1976, the legislature responded to Gregory by enacting section
627.726220 Apparently, the legislative intent in prohibiting initial
joinder was to return the public policy of the state to its pre-
Shingleton status of nonjoinder.3 ' To accomplish this goal, the legis-
lature enacted a statute which was a compromise between the legis-
lative desire to prohibit initial joinder and the judicial concerns
articulated in Shingleton and Gregory. The statute prohibited ini-
tial joinder but provided for an exception to this rule when the
insurer raised policy defenses.32 Thus, the jury would not be aware
of an insurance carrier's interest in the litigation, as advocated by
the court in Gregory. Yet, the statute embraced Shingleton's rea-
soning by allowing "all cards [to be placed] on the table" 3 by
mandating that the affected insurance carrier must file with the
court its name, the limits of the coverage and any defenses the
insurer might raise .3 This information is available to the plaintiff
during discovery, resulting in the injured parties' knowledge of the
defendant's insurance assets. The statute also provided for joinder
after the verdict or judgment. 7 Thus the need for additional pro-
29. Id. at 165.
30. Ch. 76-266(12), 1976 Fla. Laws 726 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1977)).
31. 367 So. 2d at 1005.
32. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1977) provides that
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurer shall be joined as a party defendant in an
action to determine the insured's liability. However, each insurer which does or may
provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of any judgment which
might be entered in the action shall file a statement, under oath, of a corporate
officer setting forth the following information with regard to each known policy of
insurance:
(a) The name of the insurer.
(b) The name of each insured.
(c) The limits of liability coverage.
(d) A statement of any policy or coverage defense which said insurer reasonably
believes is available to said insurer filing the statement at the time of filing said
statement.
(2) The statement required by subsection (1) shall be amended immediately
upon discovery of facts calling for an amendment to said statement.
(3) If the statement or any amendment thereto indicates that a policy or cover-
age defense has been or will be asserted, then the insurer may be joined as a party.
(4) After the rendition of a verdict, or final judgment by the court if the case is
tried without a jury, the insurer may be joined as a party and judgment may be
entered by the court based upon the statement or statements herein required.
(5) The rules of discovery shall be available to discover the existence and policy
provisions of liability insurance coverage.
33. 237 So. 2d at 165.
34. 223 So. 2d at 720.
35. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262(1)(a)-(d) (1977).
36. Id. at § 627.7262(5).
37. Id. at § 627.7262(4).
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ceedings is eliminated, thereby facilitating the Shingleton concern
for a speedy recovery.
In Markert, Chief Justice England noted that the Shingleton
court had allowed the joinder of insurance companies as a matter
of public policy.3s He stated that the real issue presented was
whether the Shingleton court had created a substantive right to sue
insurers or merely a procedural right when it indicated that the
insurer was a real party in interest. 9 The Markert majority avoided
a direct ruling on this issue, choosing instead to assert that the
statute merely provided the time at which joinder may occur.40 In
other words, according to the court the statute was procedural in
form. Yet, the court stated that section 627.7262 was consistent with
Shingleton in that the statute also recognized "insurers as the real
parties in interest . . . ...1 However, the court held that the stat-
ute's specification of when joinder could occur invaded its rulemak-
ing authority, and the court refused to adopt the substance of the
statute as a rule of procedure, as advocated in the concurring opin-
ion.4" By invalidating the statute, the supreme court has once again
required joinder at the outset of a lawsuit.
Motor vehicle liability carriers are not the only type of insurer
affected by the joinder debate. Before Markert, the legislature en-
acted section 768.045, Florida Statutes,4 3 which applies to all liabil-
ity carriers, and section 46.051, Florida Statutes" which applies to
products liability insurers. These statutes are essentially the same
as section 627.7262.15 Although the court in Markert recognized the
38. 367 So. 2d at 1005.
39. Id. Although the Shingleton court stated that insurers may be joined as parties in
interest, it stated that the legislature could change this situation by authorizing nonjoinder
clauses. 223 So. 2d at 718-19.
40. 367 So. 2d at 1005.
41. Id. However, the Shingleton court envisioned initial joinder. 223 So. 2d at 716. In
contrast, section 627.7262 prohibits initial joinder, and permits joinder after the verdict or
judgment.
42. 367 So. 2d at 1005-06. The court had endorsed a similar approach as a rule in Carter
v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976). See text accompanying notes 58-59 infra for a
discussion of Carter.
43. (1977).
44. (Supp. 1978).
45. FLA. STAT. § 46.051 (Supp. 1978) provides in part that
(1) No products liability insurer shall be joined as a party defendant in an
action to determine the insured's liability. However ...
(3) . . . [if] a policy or coverage defense has been or will be asserted, then
the insurer may be joined as a party.
FLA. STAT. § 768.045 (1977) provides in part that
(1) No liability insurer shall be joined as a party defendant in an action to
determine the insured's liability; however, ...
1979l
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existence of section 768.045, it made no determination of its consti-
tutionality." To date, section 46.051 has not been presented to the
court for a constitutional determination.
In addition to prohibiting initial joinder, the legislature has pro-
hibited reference to joinder or insurance in other areas of tort litiga-
tion. Section 455.06(2), Florida Statutes, 7 deals with the liability of
political subdivisions of the state and prohibits any suggestion of
the existence of insurance at a trial concerning the tort liability of
the subdivision. The prohibition is a condition precedent to the
partial waiver of sovereign immunity for the subdivision's liability
damages." In 1973, in School Board of Broward County v. Surette,
the court held the prohibition unconstitutional because it was pro-
cedural. 6 However, in School Board of Broward County v. Price50
the court receded from Surette and upheld subparagraph
230.23(9)(d)2, Florida Statutes, which prohibits any suggestion at
trial of liability insurance held by a school board .5 The statute was
upheld because the prohibition was a condition precedent to a par-
tial waiver of sovereign immunity. 5 While the prohibition of refer-
ence to liability insurers is procedural, subparagraph 230.23(9)(d)2
is also substantive since it implemented a constitutional right of the
legislature. 53 In other words, because the legislature is constitution-
ally authorized to waive sovereign immunity, it may also establish
the conditions of that waiver.
Reference to an insured's liability coverage was also prohibited in
medical malpractice actions, under section 768.47(1), Florida Stat-
utes.54 The statute, which is authorized by the exercise of police
power, 55 bars "any reference to insurance, insurance coverage, or
joinder of the insurer as a co-defendant in the suit. 56 In Carter v.
Sparkman, the court noted that the statute prohibited only refer-
(3) . [if] a policy or coverage defense has been or will be asserted, then
the insurer may be joined as a party.
46. 367 So. 2d at 1005 n.7.
47. (1977).
48. School Bd. of Broward County v. Price, 362 So. 2d 1337, 1339-40 (Fla. 1978).
49. 281 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1973).
50. 362 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. 1978).
51. (Supp. 1978). FLA. STAT. § 230.23(9)(d)2 (Supp. 1978) utilized the same language as
FLA. STAT. § 455.06(2)(1977) insofar as both provisions prohibit any suggestion at trial regard-
ing any insurance which would cover, in whole or in part, a judgment or award for the
plaintiff.
52. 362 So. 2d at 1339.
53. Id. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13 authorizes the legislature to enact provisions for bringing
suit against the state.
54. (1977).
55. Price, 362 So. 2d at 1339.
56. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(1) (1977).
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ence to joinder and not actual joinder itself.57 The court held that
any prohibition of reference to joinder was procedural, and thus,
unconstitutional. But the court was impressed by the legislature's
attempt to lower insurance costs by prohibiting the exposure of the
defendant's insurance coverage at trial. Accordingly, the court in-
corporated the essence of the statute as a rule of procedure for
medical malpractice trials.5s
Although Markert frustrates the legislative intent of nonjoinder,
the legislature may reassert its constitutional prerogative. The full
court has never ruled that denial of joinder is outside the purview
of the legislature." In fact, the court has specifically stated that the
legislature may provide for nonjoinder10 Thus, the time is ripe for
another legislative attempt to reassert its established policy of non-
joinder of liability insurers.
Both houses of the 1979 legislature introduced similar bills which
restated the nonjoinder policy." Although neither bill was enacted
in either house,6 2 the bills demonstrate possible constitutionally
valid solutions to the nonjoinder debate. Since the senate bill was
endorsed by a full committee, it will be utilized for this analysis.
Florida committee substitute (CS) for senate bill (SB) 1239 pro-
vides for the repeal of section 627.7262 and section 768.045.3 The bill
amends section 46.051 to cover all liability insurers, rather than
product liability insurers only.6"
The senate bill directly opposes the Shingleton decision with re-
spect to the initial joinder of insurance carriers." The Shingleton
57. 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
58. Id. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(e) provides that "[in any civil medical malpractice action,
the trial on the merits shall be conducted without any reference to insurance, to insurance
coverage, or to the joinder of an insurer as co-defendant in the suit."
59. The Markert majority had the opportunity to hold that joinder was a procedural
subject since the question was squarely before them. 367 So. 2d at 1004. However, the court
held that since section 627.7262 was "clearly" procedural in form, there was no need to reach
the issue of whether a substantive right was involved. Id. at 1005. The concurring opinion,
however, did state that joinder was a procedural matter reserved to the court. Id. at 1006.
60. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718-19.
61. Fla. SB 1239 (1979); Fla. HB 1471 (1979).
62. Fla. HB 1471 was referred to the House Committee on Commerce and then referred
to subcommittee, where it rested until the end of the session. Florida Legislature, History of
Legislation, 1979 Regular Session, House Bill Actions Report at 332. Fla. SB 1239 was referred
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, which adopted a Committee Substitute (CS) for SB
1239 in lieu of the original bill. Fla. CS for SB 1239 was favorably referred to the Senate
Committee on Rules and Calendar, in which it remained until the end of the session. Florida
Legislature, History of Legislation, 1979 Regular Session, Senate Bill Actions Report at 315.
63. Fla. CS for SB 1239 § 2 (1979).
64. Fla. CS for SB 1239 § 1 (1979).
65. See 223 So. 2d at 716, where the court discussed initial joinder of insurance carriers
in terms of when a cause of action against an insurer "vests" in an injured third party
beneficiary.
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court based its rulings on a judicial declaration of public policy in
the absence of legislative directives." The senate bill explicitly ar-
ticulates legislative directives in this area. If the bill is enacted, the
judiciary would not be free to nullify the provisions on the grounds
of judicially determined public policy. 7
Florida CS for SB 1239 begins with a strong statement of legisla-
tive intent which asserts the legislature's police power. The bill
provides that "it is the intent of the Legislature, through the exer-
cise of its inherent police power to regulate insurance, to implement
this public policy by the substantive law set forth in this section.""
The primary test for determining the validity and desirability of
the legislature's approach is derived from Shingleton. There, the
court endorsed the possibility of an affirmative legislative authori-
zation for the inclusion of nonjoinder clauses in liability policies as
a valid exercise of the legislature's police power to regulate insur-
ance. 9 Accordingly, Florida CS for SB 1239 specifically authorizes
nonjoinder clauses:
Insurers are affirmatively granted the substantive right to insert
in liability insurance policies contractual provisions that preclude
persons who are not designated as insureds in such policies from
bringing suit against such insurers prior to first obtaining a judg-
ment against one who is an insured under such policy for a cause
of action which is covered by such policy. The contractual provi-
sions herein authorized shall be fully enforceable. 0
The Shingleton court allowed joinder by designating the injured
party as a third party beneficiary to the liability contract.7' To
overcome this definition, the proposed legislation states that an
injured party is neither a third party beneficiary to the contract
between the insured and the insurer nor a party in privity to the
contract prior to a judgment against the insured.
No person who is not an insured under the terms of a liability
insurance policy shall have any interest in such policy, either as a
third party beneficiary or otherwise, prior to first obtaining a judg-
ment against a person who is an insured under the terms of such
policy for a cause of action which is covered by such policy.2
66. See id. at 715, 718-19.
67. See Holley v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 401, 405 (Fla. 1970).
68. Fla. CS for SB 1239 § 1(1) (1979).
69. 223 So. 2d at 718-19.
70. Fla. CS for SB 1239 § 1(4) (1979).
71. 223 So. 2d at 715.
72. Fla. CS for SB 1239 § 1(3) (1979).
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Because this portion of the bill is based on a legislatively established
public policy which delineates a substantive right, it should not be
altered by the Florida Supreme Court's perception of public policy."3
The Shingleton decision established, as a matter of public policy,
that joinder should not only be allowed but should occur at the
initiation of a lawsuit.7" In contrast, the bill maintains that the
liability of the insured for judgment is a condition precedent to the
liability of the insurer to be sued.
It shall be a condition precedent to the accrual or maintenance
of a cause of action against a liability insurer by a person not an
insured under the terms of the liability insurance contract, that
such person shall first obtain a judgment against a person who is
an insured under the terms of such policy for a cause of action
which is covered by such policy.75
This provision would prevent joinder of the insurer in the original
suit. Since the court in Shingleton endorsed legislative authoriza-
tion of nonjoinder contract provisions as an exercise of police
power,7" it is reasonable to assume that the court would endorse a
legislative enactment which effectively allows for nonjoinder.
Each of the foregoing legislative approaches should be sufficient
to effect nonjoinder. Yet, to ensure that at least one approach sur-
vives a negative judicial construction, the bill includes a severabil-
ity clause.77
Markert represents a judicial frustration of the legislative intent
to prevent joinder of motor vehicle liability insurers. The judiciary
established a policy of joinder prior to any declaration of intent by
the legislature. Subsequently, the legislature, in several statutes,
expressed an intent to prohibit joinder of liability insurers. Three
provisions, one of which was attacked in Markert, should be read-
dressed as a result of the holding in Markert. The case law on the
issue offers suggestions for feasible legislation. Thus, it appears that
if the legislature qualifies each of its efforts as an exercise of its
police power and carefully drafts a substantive provision, the court
should uphold the legislation. A bill presented to the 1979 legisla-
ture is properly drafted and should withstand constitutional attack.
The legislative policy concerning the nonjoinder of insurance
companies is clear. It only remains to enact a bill to implement that
policy.
JANE CAMERON HAYMAN
73. See 223 So. 2d at 715-16.
74. Id. at 716.
75. Fla. CS for SB 1239 § 1(2) (1979).
76. 223 So. 2d at 718-19.
77. Fla. CS for SB 1239 § 3 (1979).
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